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Over the years, Malta has developed an extensive
welfare system, which covers a sizeable
proportion of its population.  The expansion of the
States responsibilities for household income has
important implications for the sustainability of
Governments expenditure programmes.  Chief
among these is the progressively increasing
welfare gap: i.e the gap between social
expenditure outlays and the taxes intended to
finance them.
This  fiscal  financing  problem  will  in  the  next
decades  be  compounded  by  the  ageing  of
Maltas  population  through its impact on
pension expenditure.   A possible solution to the
ageing problem is to effect parametric changes to
the present Pay-as-you-go (PAYG)3 pension
system, such as raising the retirement age or
increasing  National  Insurance  contribution
rates.   Another approach is to replace the PAYG
arrangement  with a funded scheme, where
contributions  are  invested in order to create
funds  out  of  which  future  pensions  will  be
paid.   The  implications  of  such  a  reform
extend  beyond  the  financing  of  social
expenditure,  as  it  could  change  the  way  the
economy,  and  especially the labour market,
operates.   This  article  places  this  debate  within
the local context and assesses the principal
implications of the introduction of a funded
pension scheme for Malta.
1. The effects of ageing on public finances and
the economy
As is well known, the early decades of the next
century will be characterised by considerable
changes in the demographic structure of many
countries.  Economic growth has led to a gradual
lengthening of life expectancy and brought about
a decrease in birth rates in most developed
countries.  As a result, the proportion of the
elderly in the total population is increasing and is
expected to continue to do so in the coming
years.
This demographic transition has also affected the
Maltese economy.  Before the 1940s, both birth
rates and death rates were very high. A record
high in Maltas fertility rate was registered in 1944,
reflecting the post-World War II Baby Boom
phenomenon. Subsequently, birth, death, and
infant mortality rates declined notably. By the
turn of this century, the Baby Boom generation
will reach retirement age. Table 1 shows the
expected effects of this demographic transition
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over time. The support ratio, i.e. the number of
working-age persons per retired citizen, exhibits a
pronounced downward trend, falling from 3.74 in
1998 to 2.27 in 2020. During this period, the
number of persons aged 60 and over is projected
to rise by around 40,000 to just under 103,000 
nearly a quarter of the population.
1.1 The Effects of Population Ageing on the
PAYG system and Government Expenditure
These  demographic  developments  have
obvious  implications  for  public  finances.
Maltas present PAYG pension system can be
viewed as an implicit social contract whereby a
generation of workers finances current pensions
out of a payroll tax in return for a promise that
their pensions will be financed by a future
generation of workers.  In this sense, current
workers can be seen to be investing towards their
future pensions at a rate of return determined by
the growth of the working population and of its
average income.
In Malta, the statutory social security
contribution rates were 8.3% and 10% of wages
for employees and employers respectively up to
1998. The contribution rate of employees has been
raised to 9% in 1999, and will be further increased
to 10% in the year 2000. The amount of
contributions effectively collected, however,
typically hovered around 8% of wages for
employers and 6% for employees up to 1998. This
is partly because the amount of weekly
contributions in respect of any employee is
subject to a nominal ceiling. Inefficiencies in the
collection of contributions also partly explain this
result.
Due to its PAYG nature, whenever there is a
change in the relative proportion of workers and
pensioners, the payroll tax rate must change
accordingly in order for the system to be kept in
balance.  A simple mathematical model
approximates how National Insurance
contribution rates will have to change in order to
accommodate the pension outlays implied by the
ageing process. Contributions into and
expenditure out of the system can be described
by the following identities:
1998 2000 2020 2040
Population aged 60+ 63,100          65,000          102,700          104,900         
% of population 16.7          17.0          24.7          25.3         
% annual growth
1 - 1.49          2.31          0.11         
Population aged 15-59 236,300          240,000          232,900          233,900         
% of population 62.4          62.7          56.0          56.5         
% annual growth
1 - 0.78          -0.15          0.02         
Total Population 378,400          382,800          416,000          413,900         
% annual growth
1 - 0.58          0.42          -0.03         
Support Ratio 3.74          3.69          2.27          2.23         
1  Average annual growth rate since the year indicated in the preceding column.
Source: Central Bank, Annual Report, 1997
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Contributions into the system
= NI rate * (Average Wages * Workers)
Pension outlays
= (Replacement Ratio4 * Average Wages)
           * Pensioners
For the system to remain in balance, contribution
inflows must equal expenditure outlays, which
implies:
NI Rate * Workers
= Replacement Ratio *  Pensioners
NI Rate
= Replacement Ratio * (Pensioners / Workers)
= Replacement Ratio / Support Ratio
Data for 1998 yield an estimate of the average
wage in Malta at Lm4,900. Based on data
published with the Budget Speech for 1999, the
per capita retirement pension can be estimated at
Lm1,800. This implies an average replacement ratio
of around 37%. This appears to be low compared
to the statutory retirement pension that is
supposed to yield 66% of a persons salary. It is
however to be borne in mind that this so-called
two-thirds pension accounts for only one half
of total retirement pension outlays5. Furthermore,
the pension that can be received by any one
beneficiary is subject to a nominal cap.  Assuming
that the replacement ratio will in future remain at
37% of current wages6, then, in the light of the
projected decrease in the support ratio, National
Insurance contribution rates will have to develop
as shown in Table 2 for the pensions system to
remain in balance.
The analysis in Table 2 shows that the
contribution rate necessary to keep the pensions
system in balance in 1998, at 9.9%, was far below
the effective rates of contributions collected,
which was around 14%. Indeed, it may be argued
that the deficit on the social account has up to
now not been generated by pensions but by
other items of expenditure being charged to the
account. The Table also shows that the maximum
contribution rate to be ever needed, 16.6% in
2040, is significantly higher than the contribution
rate of 9.9% needed to balance the system in 1998.
Furthermore, it falls below the total of the
statutory contribution rates; nevertheless it is
higher than the contribution rates actually
collected. It should thus be clear that the ageing
of the population will have discernible effects on
public finances.
This analysis depends critically on the
assumption of a constant replacement ratio from
wages to pensions. This may be invalidated by
the fact that in future, a higher proportion of
pensioners will be eligible for the two-thirds
pensio.  On the other hand, if the nominal cap on









TABLE 2  THE EVOLUTION OF 
CONTRIBUTION RATES NEEDED 
TO KEEP THE REPLACEMENT 
RATIO CONSTANT
4 The replacement ratio is defined as the fraction which the average pension represents of the current average  wage.
5 The remainder is made up of a variety of schemes targeted at specific functions, such as the National Minimum Pension
and the Old Age Pension.
6 The above projection assumes that the average pension is indexed with the growth in average gross earnings, and that
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pensions to wages will be constrained
downwards.
1.2 The Effects of Population Ageing on the
Economy
The economic effects of population ageing
extend beyond government expenditure, primarily
to the generation of savings and productive
capacity.  The life-cycle hypothesis of
consumption states that as households tend to
smoothen consumption over their lifetime, elderly
people on lower income tend to save less.
Hagemann & Nicolletti (1989) estimated that
population ageing will decrease private savings in
the major OECD economies by between 5% and
12% of GNP between 1980 and 2025. Mason &
Tryon (1990) argue that from 2015 onwards, the
demographic shift will lead to global excess
demand and higher real interest rates. Lower
saving and higher interest rates could influence
adversely either the level of investment, or the
external balance, or both. Pressures on saving and
interest rates could be further accentuated by an
increase in government spending as the
population ages. In turn, lower investment and a
shrinking, and perhaps less mobile, labour force
would reduce an economys productive capacity.
In view of the considerations outlined above, it
should be clear that policy measures in relation to
population ageing must encompass the issues of
reduced saving and productive capacity as well
as the financing of pensions. Moving away from
PAYG pension systems towards funded systems
may offer solutions to these different facets of the
population ageing problem.
2.  The Theoretical Arguments Behind Funded
Pension Systems
A PAYG pension system, and the burgeoning
government debt that it implies, is economically
inefficient. It distorts economic choices and
provides only an implicit and low rate of return to
participants. Under a PAYG system, contributions
are viewed as a tax rather than as a form of saving,
and therefore provide a disincentive to work.
Furthermore, the promise of a guaranteed future
pension may discourage saving. By contrast, a
funded pension system could help economies to
save more and improve the operations of their
labour and capital markets. The resulting increase
in economic growth7 would in turn enhance the
resources available to meet future pension
payments.
2.1 The Return on Contributions under the two
schemes
Paul Samuelson (1958) demonstrated that with a
constant real wage and a population that grows
from below8, the return on contributions in a
mature  PAYG system is equal to the rate of






  Australia 7.5           5.5          
  Canada 7.0           2.8          
  Denmark 8.0           2.3          
  Germany 7.0           2.5          
  Japan 10.8           4.4          
  Netherlands 8.4           2.5          
  U.K. 11.3           3.2          
  United States 9.7           3.0          
TABLE 3  ANNUAL RETURNS ON 
PRIVATE PENSION FUNDS 




7 Feldstein estimates that the gains for the US would be as high as 5% of GDP each year in perpetuity.  Kolitkoffs
estimates for the same country stand at 4.5%.
8 That is one that increases because of increased births, not because people are living longer.Central Bank of Malta, Quarterly Review, September 1999 62
further proved that the real return on social
security  contributions  is  equal  to  the  sum  of
the  rate  of  growth of  the population and the rate
of growth of productivity (or real wages).  Since
wages tend to be a constant share of GDP, this
would be equivalent to the rate of growth of GDP.
In contrast, the return under a funded system
depends on the returns from investments in
financial assets.  Empirical evidence shows that
the real returns on financial assets nearly always
exceed the growth rate of an economy9.  This
implies that a worker usually earns a lower return
on his contributions under the PAYG system over
the long term, as can be seen in Table 3.
The higher rate of return on a funded pension
scheme could thus alleviate the problem of a
transition out of a PAYG system. This is important
because contributors during the transition period
are often required to finance the existing PAYG
system as well as to contribute towards their own
funded pension.
Due to PAYGs low return, people have to pay
more in contributions in order to finance the same
pension.  In this sense, part of the NI contribution
is a pure tax.  However, it should be borne in mind
that the higher rate of return on funded pension
systems in part reflects a risk premium.
Furthermore, the return on a funded system also
faces a demographic risk: since the increasing
number of the aged will have to sell their
accumulated assets to a diminishing number of
workers, possibly leading to lower asset prices
(Hemming, 1998).
2.2 The Labour Market  Disincentives to Work
and Tax Evasion
The complexity of social security rules often leads
workers to dissociate contributions paid into the
system from the benefits received. Contributions
are thereby regarded as a tax to be avoided,
benefits as unearned transfer payments to free-
ride and exploit. Social security contributions thus
introduce a tax wedge between the wage offered
to workers and that which they in fact earn, and
may act as a significant disincentive to work.
Workers attempt to reduce the burden of this tax
either by adjusting the number of hours worked
or by shifting into the informal labour market.  The
tax also distorts the form in which compensation
is taken, as taxable cash can be replaced by
untaxed fringe benefits.  Firms respond to higher
PAYG labour costs in formal markets by
depressing real net wages, adopting more capital-
intensive production methods or transferring
activities to countries with lower social security
costs. As economic agents avoid taxation, a
vicious circle is initiated whereby taxes would
have to be increased, leading to more tax evasion
and a larger burden on those who cannot evade
the tax.  Higher NI contribution rates would thus
amplify the distortions in the labour market. Under
a funded system, the link between benefits and
contributions is explicit. This eliminates the
adverse incentive effects of the PAYG system,
inducing the labour market to operate more
productively (Corsetti and Schmidt-Hebbel, 1995).
There are a number of indications that the PAYG
social security system in Malta may be having
disincentive effects on the labour market.  NI
contributions become a regressive tax once the
wage earned from a workers principal employment
exceeds the level associated with the maximum
amount of contributions that may be effected per
week.  Most of workers earning a lower wage
perceive this system mainly in terms of the
adverse implications of a regressive tax on social
justice.  Workers earning a wage in excess of that
associated with the cap on contributions lament
the fact that the pension benefits receivable are
also subject to a cap. Other rules of the PAYG
system may be having similar effects. For instance,
9 Hemming (1998) reports that in the G7 countries, plus Denmark, the Netherlands and Switzerland, real earnings growth
averaged about 2% during 1970-1990, whereas the real average rate of return on a 50-50 portfolio of equities and
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there exists a minimum period for which
contributions need to be effected for a worker to
qualify for benefits10. This may induce workers to
actually contribute for that period only, shifting to
underground economic activities for the rest of
their working lives. A notable exception to this
typically takes place during the last years of work,
because pensions are linked to incomes declared
and contributions effected during those years11.
The costs of underground economic activity in
Malta, and the extent to which they arise out of the
social security system, are not generally well
defined. Underground activity typically takes
place to avoid taxation. The main cost is therefore
borne by government. The rest of the economy,
however, may also bear a cost if underground
production is less efficient than that in the formal
economy. Small economies may be especially
prone to underground activities, as the typical
optimum operating size of a number of operators
would be small enough to permit them to stay
outside the formal system. In these economies,
therefore, it is especially important that the proper
incentive signals are given for operators to shift
into the formal economy if the costs of
underground activities, especially those falling on
the government, are to be avoided. The social
security system undoubtedly has an important
role to play in this respect.
2.3 Pension Systems and Saving
The fundamental motivation behind personal
saving is to enable consumption to be spread out
more or less evenly over a lifetime. According to
the life-cycle hypothesis of consumption,
households try to maintain a stable per capita level
of utility over time.  They do this, typically, by
initially borrowing (e.g. to purchase their house)
and later saving so as to repay outstanding loans
and provide for retirement when income can be
expected to drop. A pension system may lead to a
decline in household saving if the benefits
received are perceived to be higher than the cost
of contributions to the system. In other words,
households may reduce saving if they perceive
the pension system as an (unearned) addition to
their wealth.
This phenomenon may apply in the case of a
PAYG system. The first retirees under the system
typically will have paid a relatively low amount of
aggregate contributions but will have received
benefits over their entire retirement period12.
Furthermore, contributions under the PAYG
system can be perceived as costing less than the
benefits received if households are used to the
government financing a pensions deficit through
other sources of revenue - and believe that it can
continue doing so indefinitely into the future.
Finally, a PAYG system may have important
redistributive effects, whereby some - typically
lower income - households may actually receive
more by way of benefits than the contributions
paid, to the detriment of other households. The
consumption stimulated in net beneficiary
households could offset the additional saving
effected by net contributory households.
A funded pension system, where benefits are
linked to past contributions, should eliminate
distortions to saving behaviour. The replacement
of a PAYG system by a funded one is generally
expected to, on balance, increase saving - though
arguments in this respect are not unambiguous.
For instance, the higher return on contributions
10 See Social Security Act, 1987, Section 17(2).
11 See Social Security Act, 1987, Section 2.
12 Mitchell et al (1998) say that the early cohorts of retirees in the US (born before 1910) earned an implicit rate of return
of between 13% and 37% on their contributions. To account for this, Feldstein developed the notion of social security
wealth, that is, the difference between the actuarial value of the social security benefits to which you are entitled at 65
and the actuarial value of the social security taxes that you pay before retiring. Feldstein estimated this at over three-
fourths of financial wealth in the United States, which would however be significantly reduced if the effects of the
increased debt burden on future generations is accounted for.Central Bank of Malta, Quarterly Review, September 1999 64
provided by the funded system could induce
households to save more, so as to maximise future
consumption. On the other hand, target savers
typically consume more with an increase in the
return on investment. A funded pension scheme
could also increase saving if the mandatory
contribution rate is higher than the average saving
rates of individuals that were hitherto not covered
by any pension arrangement. On the other hand,
higher mandatory contribution rates under a
funded scheme could simply crowd out other
saving which the personal sector would have
effected anyway under a PAYG system. This
effect could be mitigated by the increased
awareness of future pension commitments
instilled by the funded system, and possibly by
the fact that contributions to a personal saving
account could be preferable to compulsory
National Insurance contributions. Finally, the
enhanced economic growth that could be
engendered by a funded pension system could
stimulate saving.
On the basis of the Chilean experience13,
Mackenzie, Gerson, & Cuevas (1997) conclude
that the effects of the introduction of a funded
pension scheme on saving depend crucially on the
way in which the transition away from a PAYG
system is financed. Once a funded scheme is
introduced, saving would not increase
substantially if outstanding PAYG commitments
are financed by Government debt - as increased
private saving would in this case be largely offset
by increased public dis-saving. Aggregate
(national) saving would increase only if transition
pension payments are financed by fiscal
consolidation. Thus, pension reform in Chile had a
negative impact on the countrys saving rate in
the first 9 years following the reform.  Only when
fiscal policy was subsequently tightened did the
saving rate rise.
The consideration of developments in saving is
especially important in the case of Malta, where,
notwithstanding the fact that the ageing of the
population was still far from its peak level, the
gross national saving rate fell from 29% of GDP in
1991 to 18% of GDP in 1997.  A reversal of this
trend is essential if domestic investment is to be
sustained without increasing external
indebtedness.  As discussed above, the
introduction of a funded scheme could increase
the incentives for households to save.  But the
way in which the transition from a PAYG system
to a funded scheme is financed is probably the
single most important factor that would affect the
development of national saving in this instance.
2.4 The Effects of a Funded Pension System on
the Financial Sector
The introduction of a funded pension system
generally leads to a faster development of the
financial services sector, and this, in turn, boosts
the supply of longer-term funds available for real
investment14. The system probably also ensures a
more productive use of capital, as it makes
resources available to the private sector, rather
than letting them be managed entirely by
government. Most pension funds tend to follow a
buy and hold strategy in their equity
acquisitions (Reisen, 1997), and take an active
stance in the management of the companies in
which they acquire a large shareholding, generally
contributing to improve corporate governance.
They also encourage improvements in the
standards of accounting and auditing, contribute
to the development of broking and trading
arrangements, and help establish more efficient
and reliable clearing and settlement facilities.  In
13 Chile adopted a fully funded pension scheme in 1981.
14 In Singapore, pension fund assets rose from 28% of GDP in 1976 to 73% in 1986, whereas in Chile the system which
was introduced in 1981 had accumulated assets equivalent to 26% of GDP by 1990 (Vittas, 1992). Nowadays, private
pension funds constitute the largest category of institutional investors in the capital and money markets in developed
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Chile, for instance, pension funds stimulated the
development of a corporate bond market and
facilitated the privatisation of state companies.
The magnitude of annual contributions to
pension funds is usually too high for them to be
profitably invested entirely in domestic ventures.
In small economies especially, a substantial
portion of these funds are likely to be invested in
foreign securities. In Singapore, for instance, the
national pension fund effectively operates as a
compulsory unit trust, investing in foreign assets
on behalf of Singaporean households (Vittas,
1992).  One of the main reasons why this occurs is
that international diversification of the pension
funds portfolio simultaneously raises returns and
reduces overall risk.  If pension funds were largely
invested domestically, contributors would be
heavily exposed to home-country shocks.
Furthermore, this would drive domestic interest
rates down to an unattractive level.
On the other hand, in the Maltese context,
permitting substantial overseas investment by
local pension funds could expose the country to
balance of payments risks.  It could, in fact, lead to
a considerable outflow of funds over a prolonged
period of time, since capital would only be
repatriated in order to pay the pensions of retired
persons.  If steps are not simultaneously taken to
decrease the current account deficit, or to attract
other kinds of capital inflows, the official external
reserves could drop markedly.  This situation can
be avoided if the current account position
improves, or local assets become attractive to
foreigners. These considerations demonstrate the
importance of undertaking widespread structural
reform of the economy together with the overhaul
of the pension system.
The liberalisation of capital controls may itself
mitigate some of the effects of the capital
outflows effected by pension funds. In theory, the
liberalisation of capital controls could induce
residents to repatriate foreign assets, since they
would be free to re-invest them abroad in future
should they wish to do so (Reisen & Williamson,
1994).
3. Preliminary Notions on the Process of
Transition to a Funded Pension System
In the transition from a PAYG to a funded system,
implicit pension pledges are turned into explicit
liabilities.  This process usually takes place when,
as from the determined cut-off date of the old
system, new entrants into the work force would
start paying contributions into retirement funds
Chile 126 1981 Full Recognition Bonds
Peru 37 1995 Partial Recognition  Bonds
Colombia 86 1994 Partial Recognition  Bonds
Argentina n.a 1994 Partial  Compensatory pension
Uruguay 214 1995 Partial No  compensation
Mexico 142 1994 Full Life-time Switch
Bolivia 40 1997 Full Compensatory Pension
El Salvador n.a. 1996 Full Recognition Bonds
Source: Quiesser, 1998
Country
TABLE 4  PENSION REFORM TRANSITION IN LATIN AMERICA
Implicit Pension 
Debt           
(% of GDP)
Shift to Funding Year of Introduction Financing InstrumentsCentral Bank of Malta, Quarterly Review, September 1999 66
rather than towards a PAYG system. Thus, their
contributions would no longer be available to
finance current pension benefits.  The affiliates of
the old scheme could be given the option of
either changing over to the funded scheme or
remaining within the PAYG scheme.  Those who
opt to remain with the old system would continue
paying NI contributions, and these would be
utilised for the payment of current pension
outlays in return for a PAYG scheme pension
upon retirement.
The transition towards a funded scheme can
create substantial fiscal financing problems in the
initial phases15.  The PAYG system would soon
register a deteriorating balance as contributors
into the system decline while pension recipients
increase.  Government would have to carry this
financing burden until the PAYG scheme is
completely wound up upon the demise of the last
affiliate.   The pension benefits of at least one
generation of retirees would have to be financed
out of general taxation.  Moreover the workers
who shift into the new system would require
some form of compensation for their previous
contributions.   Chile granted these workers a
recognition bond16,  which was deposited into
their  pension savings account.  Other Latin
American countries that have carried out similar
reforms  have  simply  promised  a  compensatory
pension  to  these  workers  when  they  retire17.
Details in this respect are given in Table 4.
The fiscal cost of the transition would decrease if
lower pensions are paid to the transition
generation.  Politically, this would be a very
difficult policy to implement, and it would create
resistance to the reform.  Perhaps a more
acceptable strategy would be to reduce the speed
of the transition by allowing only new entrants to
the labour force to join the funded scheme.  In this
way, revenues into the PAYG system would
decline at a slower pace.  Feldstein (1998)
proposes a staggered approach whereby
government guarantees retirement benefits but
uses the transition to the funded system to pay
for them.  The transition workers would continue
paying PAYG contributions at the current rates,
but only part of the revenue from these would go
to the funded system.  The extra payments would
be used to finance current pension benefits.
The Chilean authorities had, for some years
before the introduction of their pension reform
deliberately strengthened their fiscal stance,
leading in 1980 to a positive balance of general
government revenue equivalent to 4.4% of GDP
and a public saving rate of 7.4% of GDP.  This
prepared government finances for the impact of
the pension reform.  The transition was tax-
financed, and the budget was balanced again in
1988.  Privatisation proceeds were used to finance
the greater part of the increased pension gap -
though the government could also have financed
the gap through higher borrowing.
The dynamics of pension reform could lead one
to  think  that  the  transition  generation  pays
twice  for  its  pension18.   But  this  is  not  quite
true - as the burden on transitional working
generations  decreases  gradually  over  time.
This is because the new funded system should
lead to higher investment and faster economic
growth.
15 The current annual cost of Chiles pension reform stands at about 4% of GDP, and the obligations under the old system
will disappear only by the year 2020, when the last retiree under the system dies.  The last recognition bond issued is
expected to be redeemed by 2037.
16 Calculated to represent the present value of past contributions to the PAYG system.
17 By issuing these bonds at the moment of switching and redeeming them upon retirement, the financing of the pension
gap was extended over a longer period of time. With compensatory pensions, this period is stretched further since the
cash flows required to pay pension payments are lower than for the redemption of bonds.
18 It pays for the current pensioners through NI contributions and for its own pensions out of contributions to the funded
system.Central Bank of Malta, Quarterly Review, September 1999 67
Conclusion
Funded pension schemes carry enhanced security
for future pensioners. The claims of pensioners
are thereby backed by assets rather than by
promises that future contributors can revoke.
Funding may allow a society to finance pension
payments at a lower cost than PAYG. Its positive
externalities could also lead to higher economic
growth in the long term, by stimulating saving,
enhancing efficiency in the allocation of capital,
and improving the mechanisms governing the
operation of the labour market.
The transition from a PAYG pension system
towards a funded system may however imply
sacrifices in the short run, particularly with respect
to consumption, a higher fiscal deficit, and balance
of payments outflows. For these short run costs
not to outweigh the potential long-term benefits,
it is essential that certain prerequisites are met
before pension reform is undertaken.  In particular,
the fiscal position should be consolidated, so as
to enable the government to meet the increased
financing requirements resulting from the
diversion of social security contributions to the
funded system.  The attainment of overall
economic balance, especially within the context of
the external balance of payments, is also essential
in view of the potential outflow of capital
associated with the investment abroad by pension
funds in the early phases of the reform.
References
Aaron, Henry J., (1966), The Social Insurance
Paradox, Canadian Journal of Economics and
Political Science, Vol.32 (August), pgs. 371-377
Blake, David, & J. Michael Orszag, (1998), The
Simple Economics of Funded and Unfunded
Pension Systems, The Pension Institute,
University of London, (January)
Central Bank of Malta, (1997), Box 1: Pension
Expenditure and the Welfare Gap: The State of
the Question, Annual Report
Corsetti, Giancarlo, & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel,
(1995), Pension Reform and Growth, Policy
Research Working Paper 1471, World Bank, (June)
Cuevas, Alfredo, Philip Gerson, & G.A.
Mackenzie, (1997), Pension Regimes and Saving,
IMF Occasional Paper 153, (August)
Feldstein, Martin, (1998), Financing our Old Age
(II): A New Era of Social Security, The Public
Interest, Number 130, (Winter)
Gillion, Colin, (1998), The ILO and Pensions, ILO
Hagemann, Robert P., & Giuseppe Nicolletti,
(1989), Population Ageing: Economic Effects and
some Policy Implications for Financing Public
Pensions, OECD Economic Studies, Vol. 12,
(Spring)
Halter, William A., & Richard Hemming, (1987),
The  Impact  of  Demographic  Change  on
Social  Security  Financing, IMF Staff Papers,
Vol. 34, No. 3
Heller, Peter S., (1998), Rethinking Public Pension
Reform Initiatives, IMF Working Paper WP/98/61
Hemming, Richard, (1998), Should Public
Pensions  be  Funded?,  IMF  Working Paper
WP/98/35
Holzmann, Robert, (1996), Pension Reform,
Financial Market Development, and Economic
Growth: Preliminary Evidence from Chile, IMF
Working Paper WP/96/94, (August)
Kane, Cheikh, & Robert Palacios, (1996), The
Implicit Pension Debt, Finance and Development,
IMF, (June)
Kolitkoff, Laurence J., (1996), Privatising Social
Security at Home and Abroad, American
Economic Review, Vol. 86, No. 2, (May)Central Bank of Malta, Quarterly Review, September 1999 68
Manchester, Joyce, (1997), Taxing Issues for
Social Security, Pension Research Council, PRC
WP 97-27, (October)
Mason, Paul R., & Ralph W. Tryon, (1990),
Macroeconomic Effects of Projected Population
Ageing in Industrial Countries, International
Monetary Fund Staff Papers, Vol. 37, No. 3,
(September)
Mitchell, Olivia, & Stephen P. Zelders, (1996),
Social Security Privatisation: A Structure for
Analysis, American Economic Review, Vol. 86, No.
2, (May)
Nguyen, Nguyen X., (1994), Social Security
Issues and Elements of Reform, World Bank, (May)
Queisser, Monika, (1998), The Second-Generation
Pension Reforms in Latin America, Ageing
Working Paper AWP 5.4, OECD
Reisen Helmut, Liberalising Foreign Investments
by Pension Funds: Positive and Normative
Aspects, OECD Technical Paper No. 120, January
1997
Reisen Helmut & J. Williamson, Pension Funds,
Capital Controls and Macroeconomic Stability,
OECD Technical Paper No.98, August 1994
Samuelson, P.A.,(1958), An Exact Consumption-
loan Model of Interest with or without the Social
Contrivance of Money, Journal of Political
Economy, 66(6), pgs. 467-482
Willmore, Larry, (1998), Social Security and the
Provision of Retirement Income, Discussion
Paper PI 9805, The Pensions Institute, (February)
Vittas Dimitri, Contractual Savings and
Emerging Securities Markets, World Bank Policy
Research Paper WPS 858, February 1992